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Joint Military Operations

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Joint Military Operations

Operational Environment

Current operational environment:

The NKPA constitutes a very formidable force of over 135,000 men, most of whom have been conscripts of the Japanese and Chinese armies. These armies are adequately equipped with modern Soviet-supplied aircraft, artillery and tanks. On the other hand, the ROK armed forces comprises of less than 100,000 men who are poorly trained and ill-equipped. Massive mechanization and coordinated firepower are the focus of U.S.’s tactical doctrine.

The U.S. military power available for the operation is inadequately prepared for the forthcoming war, with army forces comprising of four understrength divisions that are ill-equipped. Nevertheless, the positive side is that McArthur’s forces have the full support of U.S. and United Nations (Mamaux, 1987).

How General McArthur’s vision for Operation Chromite relieves NKPA pressure on the U.S. Eight Army in the Pusan Perimeter

According to McArthur’s vision, an amphibious landing in the Vicinity of Inchon is capable of slicing off, halting, isolating and destroying the NKPA, synchronized with a breakout from the Pusan Perimeter by its defenders. This is to result to the liberation of Seoul and restoration of the South Korean Government, while North Korea will be immediately invaded and occupied. He believes that this mission is only achievable through a fleshed-out plan and force to execute it.

Operation Chromite is borne, which calls for X-Corps to form around the First Marine Division and the 7^th Infantry Division for purposes of executing a staged amphibious landing at Inchon and advancing inland to capture Seoul and cut the major lines of communication of the enemy while making resupplies to McArthur’s forces committed in the south. While the main challenge is pulling together the forces to make the landing, with the enemy continuously threatening the Pusan perimeter, McArthur throws available units into the fight in order to relieve NKPA’s pressure on Walker (Sweeney, 2000).

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Strategic Guidance

General McArthur’s vision for the operation environment once OPERATION CHROMITE is concluded (end state)

General McArthur’s end state is to lodge a successful amphibious landing by Marines at Inchon, about 120 miles behind enemy lines and 25 miles from Seoul. When the forces land at and capture Inchon, they will then seize the adjacent air base at Kimpo with the aim of enabling the United Nations forces to launch an attack and eventually secure Seoul. The UN forces are also expected to drive towards the west across the peninsula from their position in Pusan.

This appears as a double-envelopment for crushing North Korea from the southeast at Pusan and from the northwest at Inchon. McArthur’s plan aims at: striking at the rear of North Korea’s forces, cutting the supply lines to the south, gaining political control through the liberation of Seoul, and threatening North Korea’s capital of Pyonyang (Heineman, 2001).

The Roles of JTF 7 and X Corps in achieving General MacArthur’s end state

The X-Corps under the command of Major General Almond is charged with conducting amphibious assault at Inchon. X Corps comprise of the 1^st Marine Division, in addition to one regiment withdrawn from the Pusan Perimeter for purposes of bringing the Division to a complete wartime strength of three regiments, plus the 7^th Infantry Division. JTF-7 is a real-time joint operational command comprising of Marine, Army and Navy unites aimed at supporting the assault force.

Accordingly, JTF-7 strikes North Korean forces as a weak, undetermined joint, and this effects surprise and mass before North Koreans getting a proper ground to react (Doughty, nd). Additionally, with two divisions, X Corps accomplished their goals in a deliberate and logical manner by seizing Wolmido Island, Kimpo rtfield and Seoul.

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Decisive Points

TWO key decisive points for Operation Chromite

Seoul is a decisive point because of its symbolic value as the capital and for being the most critical node in the supply chain of the enemy attack. Seoul is the focal point for all movement in the South and it has become the most vital node in the supply chain of the communist invasion. McArthur’s great interest in the city is because of its overwhelming symbolic value. This implies that retaking it will psychologically demoralize the enemy. Thus, rather than pursuing a simple push of North Koreans to retreat from Pusan, Operation Chromite is intended to fully unhinge the enemy forces by stubbing them from the rear.

The second decisive point is the U.S involvement. Given the U.S. ground troops’ involvement, McArthur feels that he can surround and sever North Korea’s persistent and tenuous supply chains. The cutting of critical lines increases the possibility of victory regardless of the overwhelming 3:1 North Korean advantage. This realization enables MacArthur to initiate the Inchon plan, which sets the stage for the smart amphibious operation. After destabilizing the enemy psychologically by cutting supply lines, McArthur stages constant attacks on all sides, thus breaking the NKPA resistance and leading to the collapse of the army. By September, the NKPA ceases to exist as a coordinated fighting force in South Korea.

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Operational Maneuver

How Operation Chromite supports the breakout of the Eighth Army at the Pusan Perimeter

The operational maneuver for North Korean military has a close resemblance to the Chinese model. According to Mao Tse Tung, the best approach is to avoid strong points and aim at infiltrating the enemy’s lines in order to hit the rear areas that are weakly defended, thus destroying vital logistical areas. For the North Korean military, Inchon is emblematic of the weaknesses behind its entire scheme whose mission to unify Korea. Its bargains are based on the lack of capability, interest and will on the part of the American government.

The justification of this analysis is based on the signals coming from Washington and the consideration of the state of America’s military at the time. Nevertheless, North Korea’s downfall is greatly contributed by its underestimation of America’s prospects for mounting an overwhelming reaction, and it does not predict the prospect of UN-sponsored Allied effort ultimately involving forces from 16 nations (Totten, 1976).

Operation Chromite does not bring about any remarkably new ideas to the art of war. Instead, it serves to reinforce conventional aspects, such as the relevance of maintaining trained and ready forces for deterrence of aggression or confrontation of a contingency. Americans have the advantages of interior lines at the Pusan perimeter. Nevertheless, they have the freedom to utilize exterior lines due to the lack of an opposing naval force.

Despite North Koreans complete victory in the initial phases of their invasion, thy encounter a standoff around the Pusan perimeter following the US Eighth Army and UN forces’ gallant determination to stand against the onslaught of the communists. McArthur perceives the weakness of the enemy’s communication lines as early as possible. In addition, North Koreans are disadvantaged due to their terrain induced flanks. The operational art by McArthur’s forces capitalize on harmonized amphibious maneuver and interdiction for purposes of attacking the enemy’s center of gravity (Heinl, 1968).

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Joint fires

Landing forces at Inchon

Inchon was chosen by MacArthur as the landing point due to its strategic position as the port for the capital city of Seoul. The first assault was made by the 3^rd Battalion on Wolmi-do with the high tide at dawn on the 15^th of September. As a result, the enemy’s resistance was crushed. The rest of the divisions landed on the next high tide. This caused massive surprise to the enemy. The preparation of gunfire support ships and naval air for the Inchon landing occurred on the 13^th of September.

Attacking the NKPA’s lines of communications

The 1^st Marines and the rest of the 5^th Marines landed at the enemy’s lines of departure. One hour later, the 5^th Marines had lodged an assault on the sea wall through charged bamboo ladders that had been hurriedly built by Japanese workers before their embarkation. By midnight, the Marines had taken control of the main high terrain of Observation Hill and Cemetery Hill.

At dawn, the Marines destroyed North Korean T-34 tanks on the Seoul highway, which prevented North Korean artillery fire from spreading to the beachhead area. The 7^th Division also made their landing at Inchon and advanced hastily inland, with the aim of preventing enemy attacks from Suwom and the south. Few hours later, the 5^th Marines were in full control of the Seoul highway.

Interdicting any NKPA’s attempts to counterattack or reinforce forces vicinity Inchon and Seoul

Having secured its flanks, the 1^st Marine Division moved to the north on 20^th September in order to stage the 6-day battle aimed at clearing Seoul. NKPA’s bitter counterattcks eventually compelled the commitment of the 187^th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 7^th Division’s 32 Infantry Regiment, and the Republic of Korea’s Marines to the battle for Seoul. Ultimately, NKPA’s resistance broke out and the army collapsed as a result of constant attacks from all sides (Woodhouse, 2011).

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Operational Reach

How the other Services (Air Force, Marines, and Navy) provided General MacArthur with operational reach in Operation Chromite

Operation Chromite demonstrates that the scope of amphibious operations plays a vital role in all military operations. Whereas the Fleet-Marine had an inherent interplay, the Army and the Air Force also played significant roles in the execution of MacArthur’s masterstroke. In addition, the military operation in Inchon was done collaboratively. The US and the Allies worked on establishing and maintaining air and naval superiority in the area of operations, which would help in conducting an amphibious assault on Inchon, securing the beachhead and seizing Kimpo artfield, crossing the River of Han and recapturing Seoul.

The Far East Air Forces under the command of Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer played a vital role in the delivery of supplies and personnel to reinforce ROK and U.S. forces during the initial stages of the war. The Naval Forces under the command of Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy helped in improving the naval posture (Kortegaard, 2005).

How the operational reach provided an advantage to the Allies over just reinforcing the Eighth Army inside the Pusan Perimeter

The synchronization of land, sea and air operations was vital in the theater for the accomplishment of the strategic objective. Operation Chromite was successful due to the joint execution of the US Marine Corps, Air Force, Navy and Army. This realization demonstrates the need for employment of a joint force in order to establish synergies among the services, thus yielding greater combat capabilities and power for purposes of responding to aggressions and contingencies.

This realization demonstrates the need for employment of a joint force in order to establish synergies among the services, thus yielding greater combat capabilities and power for purposes of responding to aggressions and contingencies. Accordingly, the operational reach allowed the Eighth Army to ensure that the restricted flow of their supplies occurred along a secure path. The Eighth Army exploited in-depth echeloned fires across the operational area and further utilized transitions and phasing for purposes of setting the tempo.

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Arranging Operations

How General McArthur’s staff used (1) simultaneity, (2) depth, (3) timing, and (4) tempo in executing Operation Chromite in conjunction with Eighth Army activities inside the Pusan Perimeter

Simultaneity refers to the process of simultaneously applying power against vital adversary capabilities and sources of strength. Marine Air, Navy and Air Force are to strike targets ranging from the strategic marshaling areas of the enemy to tactical forces. This involves both the amphibious turning movement and the breakout from Pusan.

Operational depth was realized by Air support from the Air Force, Navy and Marines, which occurred in the months of September and early October. 4 squadrons of Panthers, 3 squadrons of Skyraiders, and 10 squadrons of Corsairs were exploited by planners for purposes of providing coverage for the landings at Inchon.

General MacArthur was in charge of the speed and rhythm of military operations. He calculated the timings of every action and essentially determined the best speed for the lodgment of amphibious assault on Inchon.

Despite supply problems, UN forces took control of the tempo of operations in the course of landings and breakout. The landing of U.S. forces consisted of a significantly high operational tempo, with the 1^st Marine Division advancing in a direct and rapid manner towards Seoul so as to ease the pressures from the Pusan defense perimeter.

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Defeat Mechanisms

Destroy

The war campaign was tailored towards destroying communists and preventing the spread of communism in the Republic of Korea. While North Koreans aimed at reunifying the two Koreas, and it had been difficult to achieve this goal using political means, they decided to resort to military means in order to gain a political edge. However, the U.S. came in to help South Koreans in order to destroy communists and prevent them from spreading their ideologists in the area.

During the initial stages, the U.S. commissioned MacArthur to assume the coordination of naval and air support for evacuations from South Korea. The 7^th Fleet landed at Formosa to prevent war from occurring between communists and exiled Chinese Nationalists on mainland China. Task Force Smith, comprising of over 500 American soldiers that posted as sentries and clerks in Japan were assembled on June 29, 1950 for purposes of assisting the overwhelmed South Korean forces.

As South Koreans flew in panic, Task Force Smith confronted the communists and hastily destroyed them. Whereas North Koreans seemed to have won during the early stages of their invasion, General MacArthur had studied their weakness and quickly devised a plan on how to destroy the enemy (Kim, 1973).

Disintegrate:

MacArthur’s campaign targeted the NKPA for disintegration in order to provide him with choices in regards to the tactical employment of forces to support strategic objectives. The U.S. intended to prevent the spread of communism and to ensure that North Korean forces were pushed out of the friendly South Korea.

Thus, a successful operation was capable of poising the United Nations forces for exploitation of operational benefits and possible taking of the fight into North Korea. Accordingly, the forces worked towards disrupting the enemy’s command and control systems, destabilizing the enemy from conducting operations in order to cause the rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to continue fighting.

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Direct and Indirect Approach

Approach used by General MacArthur in attacking the NKPA

MacArthur used the indirect approach, in which joint force capabilities and strengths were applied against the weakness of NKPA across the whole battle space to allow MacArthur’s team time for stabilizing the situation and finding a way for exploitation of their potential. The first time MacArthur considered an amphibious landing in the rear area of the enemy was while he was standing on the south bank of Han River.

MacArthur was inclined towards an amphibious operation due to his successes in previous campaigns throughout the Pacific in World War II, which were based on the doctrine of applying Allied ground, naval and air strengths against the weak points of the enemy. There were high chances of amphibious operations in unsuspecting areas because the enemy could be kept off balance and this gave the Allies the opportunity to maintain the initiative.

Why he chooses the approach

According to MacArthur, reliance on strategic maneuver to overcome great odds from the enemy is the best approach to winning a battle. However, direct approach merely insinuates a frontal attack that can only result to a prolonged and costly campaign. The ability of MacArthur’s forces to operate at sea and in the air, where NKPA could not, was a vital element of success. By continuously leveraging dimensional advantages, MacArthur was able to fully utilize UN strengths and to slow the invasion of statistically superior forces which operated along ordinarily advantageous internal lines.

His previous application of amphibious landings in the Pacific against the Japanese had provided MacArthur with the requisite experience for decision making on an amphibious landing at Inchon, far at the rear of the enemy lines, with the aim of cutting off communication lines and quickly capturing Seoul (Ballard, 2001).

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Operational Risks

Risk 1: Unpreparedness	Mitigation: U.S. forces recovered from their earlier unpreparedness due to the residual skills of the reserve forces.
Risk 2: McArthur’s ROK forces were few, with limited transport available to hastily commit them	Mitigation: He expeditiously informed the JSC about the need to commit American power
Risk 3: Necessity to secure the Pusan perimeter	Mitigation: Joint amphibious operations were adopted, through inter-service collaboration. The skillful use of the Army, the Air Force and the Fleet-Marine helped in the successful execution of Operation Chromite
Risk 4: Scarcity and piecemeal arrival of trained and ready forces	Mitigation: MacArthur made crucial determinations on the time, place and methods of Operation Chromite. As such, the fact that there were highly skilled amphibious specialists available was utilized to the advantage of the U.S. and her Allies.
Risk 5: Limited range of operation and numbers of land-based close air support aircraft	Mitigation: McArthur’s strong visionary leadership enabled him to convince JSC that the risks were minimal and that the operation would succeed anyway. His confidence brought more stronger Allies to the equation.

References

Ballard, J. R. (2001). Operation Chromite Counterattack at Inchon. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES.

Doughty, R. E. (nd). The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76. Leavenworth Papers No. 1. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Heineman, J. A. (2001). The Operational Leadership of General Douglas McArthur in OPERATION CHROMITE. A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

Heinl, R. D. (1968). Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign. Lippincott.

Kim, C. K. (1973). The Korean War. Kwangmyong Publishing Company.

Kortegaard, B. L. (2005). Inchon–Operation Chromite.

Mamaux, D. H. (1987). Operation CHROMITE: operational art in a limited war. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES.

Sweeney, E. D. (2000). The United Nations Landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite. NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT.

Totten, J. (1976). Operation Chromite: A Study of Generalship. Armor, 85, 33-38.

Woodhouse, D. B. (2011). Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War. School of Advanced Military Studies.

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Force Development in the Army

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Force Development

F103: The manner in which Phase 3, Phase 4, or Phase 5 of the process is likely to be most impacted by the reading, General Odierno AUSA Winter Symposium.

As established in the readings, the aspect of force development (FD) remains an essential element in the definition of the Army’s force structure (Thompson, 2014). It is in this case vital to consider the fact that the development aspect of a Force entails the definition of the capabilities of the military through an approach that seeks to develop appropriate force structures that provide the required capabilities that translate to organizations concepts.

In achieving the goals of the forces, it is essential to consider that there are models that are developed which reflect on the systems that provide force integrative measures and functions in force development. These models in this case reflect on the sequences of events and the manner in which these functions relate to one another (Thompson, 2014). The force development process therefore entails a network of processes that are directed towards generating the required fighting requirements, the provision of resources, the conductions of research and development.

In this case, the resultant products of the force development process remains in the acquisition and distribution of training, materials and personnel in the Army, directed towards the achievement of an ultimate goal of fielding a resourced and properly structured force (Thompson, 2014). As determined, the generation of requirements for an organization or materials is known to initiate the proponents that are known in the development of documented force structures. Effective resource structures are in this case brought into culmination through the systematized approach of planning, budgeting, and execution of functions.

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Phase 3 of the Force Development Process

The third phase of the Army Development process is considered as that of the development of organizational models. This phase is determined as an execution phase where the Army personnel’s move from a general design and approved state to a more specified model within the units with the aim of meeting an organizational capabilities gap (Thompson, 2014).

I other words, the third phase of the force development process entails a stage where the Army transitions into the application of operational and doctrinal realities to the derived concepts that have over time been developed between the first and the second phases. This marks the process where the development of responsibilities transitions from the developers primarily under the TRADOC and ARCIC to the force development arm of the Army also determined as G-3/5/7.

It is factual to consider that this phase starts when the force designs and updated (FDU) decisions that integrate the aspect of organizational change. In line with this, the proponents of TRADOC and employed in the development of new designs or in the correction of discrepancies within an existing organization (Thompson, 2014). Empirically, this can only be achieved when organizational issues, concepts and units reference sheets (URS) are developed effectively.

The Manner in which this Phase is impacted by General Odierno AUSA Winter Symposium

As depicted by General Odierno during the AUSA Winter Symposium, the primary purpose of the Army is one that is considered as steadfast with the functions of fighting and winning National battles, a factor that requires the Army to do much more. In this case, there is a need of developing an Army that is innovative and adaptive ad can be flexible within any circumstance.

This fundamentally calls for a change in the manner in which business functions of the Army are conducted, thus calling for the leaders to remain cognizant of these functions (Thompson, 2014). This transition is in this case essential in changing the manner in which the Army is structured, organized and equipped, a factor that integrates the element of the third phase of the force development process.

F104: Adjustments to the Process or the Systems that DOD and the Army use to develop materiel capabilities

Adjustments in material development and acquisition systems as used by the Army and the DOD is essential in extending and enhancing the services of these departments and capabilities in order to protect the men and women who protect Nations. The development of material and acquisition programs can be determined through the Defense Acquisition Management Systems with this programs and services developed to comply with the regulations that govern these systems and developed appropriate approaches of acquisition regulations (Thompson, 2014).

The process of material capabilities and acquisition process is divided into phases that include material solution analysis, risk reduction, technology maturation, production and deployment, manufacturing development and operations and support management approaches.

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In this case, it is determined that some of the areas that require adjustments in terms of material capabilities and acquisition entail the element of balancing of tradeoffs between the proponents of schedule, cost and performance. Programs therefore need to be assessed on the developed criteria’s that contain the requirements of an acquisition program baseline and are in many instances denigrated since they fail in terms of costs, quality and their ability to offer quick responses (Thompson, 2014).

This consequently explains the rationale behind the failures in many of the acquisition processes that are frequently cancelled whey fail to meet the pre-established threshold in relation to performance, schedule and time.

One of the primary accountability systems includes the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) which remains effective in determining the point at which the material program has to shift from just being a system or concept into an actual program of record (POR). This therefore requires that an acquisition program manager (PM) needs to have a properly developed system that is aligned to the acquisition program baseline.

Budgets also need to be developed to aid the material programs (Thompson, 2014). As determined by the APB documents and thresholds, exiting a program performance, cost and schedule requires the managers to report the breaches that are imminent and actual within the baselines.

In support of the author of the CRS report on the aspect of establishing a better approach through which the authorities need to remain accountable over the existing systems, there is a need of inclusively involving the government and other stakeholders in the development of accountability systems that spur the aspects of costs and performances of the programs. This can be extensively seen through the development of legislative systems and regulatory structures in the achievement of a proper acquisition system (Thompson, 2014). An instance of this can be seen in the weapons systems acquisition reforms Act of 2009.

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F105:The challenges articulated by GEN Odierno, and the viability of the newly proposed Army force generation model as sufficient in providing adequately manned, equipped, and trained Army forces to meet global requirements.

Some of the challenges that the army face as detailed by GEN Odierno include the threats that have inhibited the U.S homeland and project power. These threats are considered to originate within the densely urban regions with the long-range strikes considered to prove inefficient in the defeat of these threats (Thompson, 2014).

The complexities of the challenges in this case require an Army force that has the capacity to conduct missions within the foreign land with the aim of defending and supporting the civil authorities. This can only be achieved through an operation that requires the inclusion of innovative and adaptive approaches ad leaders that have the capacity to thrive within complex situations.

In line with this, it is therefore essential to consider the act that the proposed Army force generation model remains a sufficient element in the provision of equipped, manned, and trained Army personnel ready to meet the tasks ahead (Thompson, 2014). This is in consideration of the fact that the new generational model has been restructured to enable the Army to adapt and modernize within their missions. The model is inclusively developed through a change management that incorporates several systems that have the capacity to change the structural approaches of the Army.

F106: The Mitigation Strategies that may be used in Supporting and increase or decrease in the Reliance on Contract Support.

Over the recent past, it has been established that the Army and the DOD have constantly taken approaches geared towards improving the use of operational contract approaches. The development of these contract support systems is wholly attributed to the success of the efforts of congress that ensured that appropriate modalities are put in place in order to improve the processes (Thompson, 2014).

An instance of this can be seen in Congressional efforts that were developed towards Iraq and that saw the establishment of a Special Inspector General in this state including other such as Afghanistan. In achieving the goals of the forces, it is essential to consider that there are models that are developed which reflect on the systems that provide force integrative measures and functions.

Some of the efforts that congress has enacted with the aim of mitigating the use of contractors include the changes and improvements made in supporting operational contract and the establishment of legislations that are developed to support the roles and functions of the Deputy Assistant of Defense Secretary (Thompson, 2014).

Other legislations also developed to mitigate the elements of reliance on contract support include the establishment of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund and the other hearing and oversight approaches directed towards raising the awareness of the contractors who intentionally abuse and lead to the development of a Task Force 2010.40

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These models in this case reflect on the sequences of events and the manner in which these functions relate to one another. On the other hand, there is a need of ensuring that appropriate systems are developed with the aim of ensuring the aspect of accountability and transparency are employed within these systems (Thompson, 2014). The development of these contract support systems is wholly attributed to the success of the efforts of congress that ensured that appropriate modalities are put in place in order to improve the processes.

Budgets also need to be developed to aid the material programs. As determined by the APB documents and thresholds, exiting a program performance, cost and schedule requires the managers to report the breaches that are imminent and actual within the baselines.

References

Thompson M.(2014) Reshaping the Army.[serial online]. November 4, 2013;182(19):34. Available from: Academic Search Premier, Ipswich, MA. Accessed April 4, 2016.

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Active Duty Military and Alcohol

1. Introduction

Active duty military is understood as the younger workforce serving the military workforce, where many of the enlisted force comes in between the age of 17 through 24 years old; while seniors of active duty comprises of 27 through 34 years (Wooten, 2015). They are those who are directly or indirectly involved in mobilized military operation including combat. Alcohol abuse has always been common among these active duty military, making ubiquitous practice of heavy drinking as nothing new to the American military system (Larson et al., 2014).

Considered as an accepted custom, drinking is simply considered by military army as a reward for their hard work, and as a commodity that ease their personal tensions since socializing with drinks promotes camaraderie (O’Brien, Oster, & Morden, 2013; Westermeyer & Kimbrel, 2013). There is no denying the fact that heavy drinking is conditioned by the easy availability of alcohol beverages which military personnel received at a reduced rate.

The essay looks into how alcohol consumption has become common among those in active duty military, and how there are risks involved in drinking like physical decline and mental and psychological comorbidities. The essay also provides a conceptual approach towards prevention and treatment of alcohol related issues in military department, by taking up certain structured measures taken up by the government to prevent the cause and spread of alcohol consumption.

Active Duty Military and Alcohol Related Matters in the United States

2.1. Identifying unique PROBLEMS IN Active Duty Military

Earlier, the combat at the Vietnam War caused many military men to become addicted to drugs in 1960 and 1970s, since many were serviced with drugs to make them tolerate the challenges of war environment (O’Brien et al., 2013). Reportedly there was misuse of drugs during this time, and this misuse has been attributed towards the military personnel using drugs for pain relieving and mental trauma issues.

Over the years, prescription of drugs has simply increased because of the availability of more drugs, and because of the wider prescription of medications, followed by intake of alcohol among the military department (O’Brien et al., 2013). This increase in intake of alcohol among military personnel has come to be associated with the recent military combats at Iraq and Afghanistan.

Such increase in the intake of alcohol emanates from many issues associated to their work, like the challenges of war, the stress involved with their work, and experiencing traumatic events that triggers off mental and psychological issues (Robert M. Bray, 2006; Cook, 2007; O’Brien et al., 2013). Many of those engaged in military operations at Iraq and

Afghanistan showed that they have been experiencing stress and strains over long deployments, extreme combat exposure, facing physical injuries, traumatic brain injuries, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), thereby making them to easily succumb to alcoholic abuse (NIDA, 2011).

Wide availability of prescribing drugs also culminates toward drug abuse. According to the report by NIDA (2011, p. 1), “soldiers screened 3 to 4 months after returning from deployment to Iraq showed that 27 percent met criteria for alcohol abuse and were at increased risk for related harmful behaviors (e.g., drinking and driving, using illicit drugs).” Alcohol usage has also been strongly identified with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which comes from the traumatic experiences that military members experienced during the war (Leskin, 2015).

Such suffering culminates towards the victim to fail in becoming good parents and good members of the society, owing to lack of communication and social skills. To quote (NIDA, 2011, p. 1) again, “Mental illness among military personnel is also a major concern. In another study of returning soldiers, clinicians identified 20 percent of active and 42 percent of reserve component soldiers as requiring mental health treatment.

Drug or alcohol use frequently accompanies mental health problems and was involved in 30 percent of the Army’s suicide deaths from 2003 to 2009 and in more than 45 percent of non-fatal suicide attempts from 2005 to 2009.”

Many of the military personnel also consume alcohol simply to experience pleasure. The pursuit of pleasure through alcohol makes them to forego pain, and feel normal or feel euphoric for some time. The reward in term of such sensations allows them to release neurotransmitters called endorphins, thereby experiencing psychological and physiological exhilaration (O’Brien et al., 2013). Such engagement does not lead to any constructive behaviors, but only makes the person to become nonproductive and harmful in nature. Excess of alcohol consumption makes them to suffer from hijacking or from the aberration of normal brain function, thereby making them to become active in their work or when they are deployed.

Excess of alcohol consumption among active duty military men are known to lose their productivity or contract alcohol related diseases that leads to premature death (O’Brien et al., 2013). The difficulty with this situation is that many of them are left untreated, or do not undergo treatment. Thus, the prevention and remedies for alcohol abuse is not only a matter of diagnosis, but it is also about treating the alcohol abusing patients among active duty service members, and also among those in post-deployment stage.

2.2. Comparative Analysis of Active Duty Military with the OVERALL POPULATION of the United States

Although not in similar excess trend with the military personnel, American civilians often resorts to binge drinking occasionally (Cucciare et al., 2015). Access drinking as a problem of the society has simply become a part of American culture, which is slowly degrading the public health and safety system. Even among civilians, alcoholism has always been the problem and the disease, making the National Institute on Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse (NIAAA) since 1970 to identify ‘alcohol abuse’ as the main national health priorities (Cook, 2007).

Alcoholism related issues such as drunk driving, domestic violence, and other alcohol related abuse is nothing new to the American citizens. Thus, taking social context into perspective, the Americans suffer from innate propensity towards alcoholism, making alcohol consumption a part of their innate culture.

The abuse of alcohol among military and civilians has been acknowledged by the United States military department as having adverse effects on the user’s health and behavior, as well as to their civilian families. It is true that alcohol usage is considered illegal for those who are under the age of 21 in the country, but rampant availability of liquor continue to have negative impact on the functioning of the society as a whole.

This excess of alcohol consumptionhas always been fairly consistent and studies by Westermeyer & Kimbrel (2013) that heavy drinking among military men are always twice as much as military men, and military men also consumes four times higher than military women, while military women consumes twice as more than civilian women. Thus, civilians are as likely to develop alcohol consumption disorders as any military personnel.

Research by Bray et al., (1991) shows that while military people are more likely to consume more alcohol than the civilians, drugs and tobacco are consumed more by the civilians. Drinking within the military group is again higher with the younger military men and women, and even among civilians, intake of alcohol is higher among the younger men and women.

Civilians as well as military efforts to deal with alcohol and drug issues are also directed towards solving the issues of the younger people, so that alcoholic and addiction do not grow on them. Again, many of the military men who suffer from alcohol addiction are higher among unmarried men, which is similar to civilians (Bray et al., 1991). In fact, when demographic comparisons among the unmarried alcoholic men are taken up, addiction and alcohol rate consumption remains the same.

2.3. Treatments and Other Practical Remedies for the issues relevant to the Active Duty Military population

Given the alcohol availability, any military personnel become vulnerable to addiction and are put to risk. To solve the issues of alcohol related issues, several researchers, public health entities, host of government agencies, and laws are working together in the country. Prevention policies in terms of detecting drinking problem at an early stage, and holding specific intervention remains as the best remedy to cure alcoholism.

Treatment and practical remedies in regard to alcohol consumption should initially start with educating the population on how alcohol consumption can lead to risky behavior and how it is harmful to their health (O’Brien et al., 2013). In military department, such policies are enforced during the training process, although effective acknowledgement among the military unit remains inapplicable.

Standard drinking level, like the requirement of not exceeding 14 standard drinks per week for men and 7 drinks per week for women can be imposed or made known to the people, in order to avoid excess consumption (O’Brien et al., 2013). Among military personnel as well as the civilians, environmental strategies prevent alcohol problems remain effective.

These include, raising minimum legal drinking age (21); enforcing the legal minimum purchasing age; increasing taxes on alcoholic drinks; offering no discount to any alcohol beverages; and holding the liquor retailer to be responsible for any issues that comes out of alcoholic drinks (O’Brien et al., 2013). In the words of Cook (2007, p. 1), excess of alcohol consumption can be maneuvered by “both public and private, to reduce excess drinking directly – education, persuasion, counselling, treatment, sanctions of various sorts, [and by ] restricting availability or raising the price – licensing, product and sales regulation, liability rules, taxes, partial or complete bans”.

Owing to many alcohol related cases in military department, the department itself in the United States has also been undertaking comprehensive steps over the past many years to solve these complex issues. Certain legal measures have been taken up by the United States Government to control excess of alcohol consumption among US military personnel from 1980s onward.

This initially started with the Supreme Court of the country declaring in 1988 that the ‘Department of Veterans Affairs’ as not responsible towards paying benefits of alcoholic drinks for the military veterans, since such benefits always results into willful misconduct (O’Brien et al., 2013). In regard to the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) specifically, they offered series of policies that could help in controlling and preventing the use of alcohol.

The DoD’s effort started in 1970s, when the department passed “The Controlled Substances Act of 1970”, targeting to reduce the usage of drugs at the outset, and later towards smoking and tobacco consumption (Robert M. Bray, 2006). Later, the act also targeted the consumption of alcohol by detection at an early stage and undergoing intervention through law enforced testing (like the urinalysis testing program).

Since legal court disbanded this testing program, DoD later came up with a new measurement that stated that alcohol consumption does not live up to military performance standards (Bray, 2006; Harbertson et al., 2016). Vietnam War and it subsequent result like the prevention of the atrocious war memories that led to high substance abuse among war veterans led to the department to again re-enforced drug and alcohol testing, and emphasizing zero tolerance policies on alcohol and drugs while on duty (Robert M. Bray, 2006; Cook, 2007).

The turn of the millennium saw the DoD and its policies continuing to condemn alcohol abuse (binge or heavy), and other drugs usage, since such abuse brings down the health and the military readiness (active participation) of the military personnel, and since the country needs to maintain high standards of performance and discipline. All such measures are expected deployment military department to decrease their alcohol intake, and perform better as a unit.

3. Finding and Conclusion

It is seen that alcohol abuse remains substantially common among the military personnel that requires stringent efforts on the part of the government (laws and acts), the DoD, medical institutions, and other individual and public efforts to solve and mitigate the issues. Since the Americans involvement in world politics has become popular and regular, military deployment and combat is expected to continue for the American military department.

Contextualizing such issues, the institutions and laws trying to prevent the abuse should use structured approach that will target the entire military populations of the country, and try to mitigate the issue. In this way, the risk to develop alcohol abuse and disorder emanating from such abuse becomes less relevant and less probable in nature. Taking a comprehensive approach to decrease alcohol abuse will allow the fostering of opportunities for military personnel during and after deployment in the field.

It also means that there will be more positive role models for the younger and older citizens to look up to, and also for their own military peer. These efforts to curb alcohol abuse are expected to make military personnel to appreciate and become culturally responsive to military lifestyles and structures.

References

Bray, R. M. (2006). Department of Defense survey of health related behaviors among active duty military personnel: A Component of the Defense Lifestyle Assessment Program. RTI International, (December), 1–307.

Bray, R. M., Marsden, M. E., & Peterson, M. R. (1991). Standardized comparisons of the use of alcohol, drugs, and cigarettes among military personnel and civilians. American Journal of Public Health, 81(7), 865–869. http://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2014.301901

Cook, P. J. (2007). Paying the Tab: The Costs and Benefits of Alcohol Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from https://books.google.co.in/books?id=pMpThh2C6ccC&dq=THE+COST+AND+BENEFITS+OF+ALCOHOL+CONTROL…AUTHOR+PHILLIP+J.+COOK.&source=gbs_navlinks_s

Harbertson, BR, H., EY, A., NL, M., & PT, S. (2016). Pre-deployment Alcohol Misuse Among Shipboard Active-Duty U.S. Military Personnel. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 51(2), 185–194.

Larson, M. J., Mohr, B. A., Adams, R. S., Wooten, N. R., & Williams, T. V. (2014). Missed Opportunity for Alcohol Problem Prevention Among Army Active Duty Service Members Postdeployment. American Journal of Public Health, 104(8), 1402–1412. http://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2014.301901

Leskin, G. (2015). Preventing Substance Abuse in Military Members and Their Families. Prevention Tactics, 9(14), 1–10.

M.A., C., A.G., S., M.A., M., J.C., T., G.M., C., X, H., & B.M., B. (2015). Associations between deployment, military rank, and binge drinking in active duty and Reserve/National Guard US servicewomen. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 153, 37–42.

NIDA. (2011). Substance Abuse among the Military , Veterans , and their Families. National Institute on Drug Abuse, (April), 1–2.

O’Brien, C. P., Oster, M., & Morden, E. (2013). Substance Use Disorders in the U.S. Armed Forces. Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences.

Westermeyer, J., & Kimbrel, N. A. (2013). Substance Use Disorders Among Military Personnel. In B. A. Moore & J. E. Barnett (Eds.), Military Psychologists’ Desk Reference. New York: OUP USA.

Wooten, N. R. (2015). Military Social Work: Opportunities and Challenges for Social Work Education. Journal of Social Work Education, 51(1), S6–S25. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-011-0234-5

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The IRA (Irish Republican Army)

The IRA

Introduction

This paper explores the Irish Republican Army (IRA) regarding its organizational structure and operations. The paper shows the determination and overwhelming support that the IRA had in its bid to unify Ireland and secure socialist independence from the British rule.

The IRA Operations

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA) was an Irish republican paramilitary organization established with the purpose of rendering British rule in Ireland ineffective and securing socialist independence during the Troubles-era.

The IRA, known by different names including the Provisional IRA, the Provos, and PIRA among others aimed at unifying Ireland by all means. The Provisional IRA took over from the original IRA in 1969 after the republican movement split. From its inception, the group’s operations were independent of political influence.

The Troubles had begun in 1968 when the Royal Ulster Consabulary (RUC) and Ulster loyalists attacked a Catholic-constituted civil rights group (Cottrell, 2014). As a result of the violent attack on the peaceful campaigners, a riot ensued in August 1969 leading to the deployment of British troops.

Whereas the IRA’s initial campaign was defensive, the group resorted to an offensive campaign in 1971 aimed at forcing the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The IRA employed guerilla tactics against RUC and the British army in both urban and rural establishments. The group also ran a bombing campaign in England and Northern Ireland with the aim of achieving socialist independence.

Following the re-admission of the IRA’s political wing into the Northern Ireland peace talks, the group called a final ceasefire in July 1997. The IRA disarmed in 2005 under international supervision. Since the Provisional IRA ceasefire, there have been several groups that have emerged such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA. These splinter groups are still operating in the low-level nonconformist Irish Republican campaign.

Organizational Structure and Scope

Leadership

According to Horgan and Taylor (2007), the IRA was one of the most sophisticated and highly organized paramilitary groups in the world. The IRA’s organization was structured hierarchically. The IRA Army Council was the top leadership of the organization, headed by the Chief of Staff.

The Chief of Staff appointed the General and the Quartermaster General, consisting of heads of departments for security, operations, publicity, intelligence, training, engineering, finance, and armory. The Council is responsible for the day-to-day running of the organization (Boyne, 1996).

The General Army Convention (GAC) was the supreme decision-making arm of the IRA and met on relatively rare occasions. The IRA Constitution provided for GAC meetings to be conducted once every two years but for exceptional circumstances which would call for a postponement of the meeting.

GACs met regularly before 1969, after which they have only met thrice in 1970, 1986 and 2005. The rarity of their meeting has been a result of the need to maintain secrecy for the large IRA group. The GAC thus elected an executive comprising of 12 members, who selected seven volunteers to the IRA Army Council.

Regional Command

The IRA comprised of the Northern Command operating in the nine Ulster counties and the Louth and Leitrim border counties, and a Northern Command which operated in the other parts of Ireland. Most of the IRA members came from Northern Ireland and the Border counties, while others come from Louth-Armagh border area, Donegal, Derry, and Belfast. Initially, the IRA’s leadership was based in Dublin, but in 1997, the Northern Command was granted the “war-zone” command parallel to the introduction of local cell structures (Kennedy-Pipe, 2014).

Brigades

The IRA’s ordinary members were referred to as volunteers (Moran, 2016). They were organized into units according to conventional military structures. Volunteers based in one area established a company as part of a battalion or brigade. The brigades were organized in county lines although at times they were subdivided especially in major urban settings.

The Belfast Brigade comprised of three battalions in the east, north and west parts of the city. During the initial years of the Troubles, the Belfast Brigade expanded very fast from just 50 members in 1969 to 1,200 members at the end of 1971. The Belfast Brigade became large but loosely controlled.

In 1972, the Derry Battalion was upgraded to a brigade following a rapid increase in membership. The increased membership was due to the killing of 13 unarmed demonstrators at a civil rights march during the Bloody Sunday. The Derry Brigade further controlled the northeastern County Donegal and northern County Londonderry (Boyne, 1996).

County Armagh comprised of four battalions; with the two battalions in South Armagh being more active than the two units in North Armagh. Particularly, Tyrone consisted of a large IRA presence with three Brigades operating in the east, mid and west. The notorious East Tyrone Brigade also commanded county Monaghan.

The IRA battalions and companies were structured similarly with each comprising of a commanding officer, quartermaster, intelligence officer, and explosives officer. Some battalions and companies further recruited a finance officer or training officer.

Active Service Units

The operational arm comprised of cells referred to as Active Service Units (ASUs). Each cell comprised of five to eight members (Boyne, 1996). From 1973, due to security vulnerability, the organization began to break the larger conventional military structure. Battalion structures were replaced by a system of two parallel types of unit within the brigades.

The company structures were reconstituted to deal with such tasks as hiding weapons, intelligence-gathering, and “policing” nationalist areas. Whereas the old “company” structures provided support services, ASUs were tasked with the bulk of actual tasks. For purposes of improving operational capacity and security of the IRA, ASUs were smaller, tight-knit cells. The brigade’s quartermaster controlled weapons in the unit cells.

Apart from the rest of brigades and battalions, the South Armagh Brigade retained its traditional hierarchical structure and deployed a relatively larger number of volunteers in its operations. The reason for the brigade’s smooth running of operations is because it did not have as many security problems as the other brigades.

The Southern Command comprised of a Southern Brigade and various ASUs in rural areas, which were responsible for importing and storing arms for the Northern units and mobilizing finances through robberies and other means.

It is not clear on the number of people that joined the IRA during the Troubles. In the late 1980s, the IRA’s membership in Northern Ireland was estimated at 300 in ASUs and about 450 in supporting roles. This did not account for the IRA units in the Republic of Ireland or Britain, and continental Europe. In 2005, the government recorded an approximation of 1,000 to 1,500 active IRA members.

Logistical and Operational Requirements

During the initial stages of the Troubles, the IRA was poorly armed. It used the traditional World War II weaponry such as Thompson submachine guns and M1 Garands. However, in the early 1970s, the IRA obtained sophisticated weapons from they’re the United States and Libya supporters and purchased more weapons from dealers in the Middle East, America, Europe and other parts of the world.

The support from the IRA’s allies was regarding sharing training techniques, weapons and funding (Gill et al., 2014). Whereas Libya’s donation of arms to the organization was prevalent in the 1980s, the IRA attracted massive support from its Irish-American allies who provided funding and guns. The IRA was well funded to the extent that they provided a stipend to its members and offered support to families of incarcerated members.

The IRA organized for fundraising in the Irish Republic, the United and across the continent to provide for the relief of the families of IRA prisoners. Sinn Fein, the IRA political wing, is reported to the richest political party in Ireland. Most of the funding for Sinn Feinn was from the United States (Taylor, 2014). The Irish Northern Aid Committee based in the United States is reported to have been the principal source of IRA funds.

Supporters of IRA in the United States raised funds directly and indirectly, at lectures, film shows, house parties, dinners and collections in clubs and bars. Cash was also raised through Sinn Fein’s commercial activities such as books, pamphlets, and Christmas cards.

The IRA supplemented imported weaponry by developing their own. The rationale behind the production of weapons was to avoid dependency on supply into Ireland by air or by the sea, which was not fully reliable. Thus, the IRA called on the services of experienced engineers to help in building weapons such as home-made mortars. The organization also engaged the use of university-educated computer experts to volunteer in the construction of sophisticated timing and remote-control mechanisms that were used in mortars and bombs.

Reports indicate that the IRA utilized the ceasefire period for upgrading these mechanisms and developing techniques for combating the ‘disruptive’ radio signals used by the British Army. In 1993, the Garda uncovered an IRA workshop, where a wide range of advanced electronic detonators was being produced (Gill & Horgan, 2013).

During the initial years of the conflict, the IRA majorly focused on the provision of support to nationalist rioters and defending of nationalist areas. As a result, the IRA obtained support for its activities due to their perceived efforts to defend the Irish nationalist and Catholics against aggression.

Between 1971 and 1994, the IRA engaged in offensive operations targeting the RUC, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), the British army and Northern Ireland economic targets, while some IRA members attacked Protestant civilians. The IRA also targeted British government officials, the British Army in England, judges, and politicians.

During the Troubles era, IRA members became skilled in the production of explosives from substances such as fertilizers and nitrobenzene. These explosives were utilized in both small devices for throwing at the North’s security forces and large bombs for blowing up buildings. The NRA also produced home-made weapons such as the drogue bomb and nail bomb. The IRA used the ceasefire period to produce the ‘Mark 17’ mortar, which to date is one of the most destructive weapons in the world (Gill, 2017).

The IRA decommissioned its weapons in 2005 under international supervision. The weapons decommissioned included; handguns, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, detonators, flamethrowers, surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, tonnes of Semtex, and rifles.

Conclusion

While the public reacted to the IRA’s activities with love and criticism in equal measure, it is evident that the organization played a huge role in raising economic and political activism in Ireland and the development of modern warfare equipment. The organization stands out as one of the most properly structured paramilitary groups in the world.

References

Boyne, S. (1996). Uncovering the Irish Republican Army. Jane’s Intelligence Review. Retrieved from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/weapons.html

Cottrell, P. (2014). The Anglo-Irish War: The Troubles of 1913–1922. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Gill, P. (2017). Tactical Innovation and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(7), 573-585.

Gill, P., & Horgan, J. (2013). Who were the volunteers? 1 The shifting sociological and operational profile of 1240 provisional Irish Republican Army members. Terrorism and Political Violence, 25(3), 435-456.

Gill, P., Lee, J., Rethemeyer, K. R., Horgan, J., & Asal, V. (2014). Lethal connections: The determinants of network connections in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1970–1998. International Interactions, 40(1), 52-78.

Horgan, J., & Taylor, M. (1997). The provisional Irish Republican army: Command and functional structure. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(3), 1-32.

Kennedy-Pipe, C. (2014). The origins of the present troubles in Northern Ireland. Routledge.

Moran, J. (2016). From Northern Ireland to Afghanistan: British military intelligence operations, ethics and human rights. Routledge.

Taylor, P. (2014). The Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein. A&C Black.

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Operation Anaconda Command Structure

Thesis: In the eyes of the public Operation Anaconda was a success but some challenges in the aspects of joint command structure, the unity of command, and joint operations.

Supporting Topic 1: Joint Command Structure on Operation Anaconda

Supporting Idea 1: The command structure is made up of a team which execute orders based on the instruction from the authority. The forward support structure in the Anaconda operation was essential to ensure proper allocation of the resources and the tactical conductivity of the process. Being a military operation, it comprises of several troops which create multiple levels of complexity. Interactions between the troops are highly complicated creating a challenge in the organization flow of information.

Supporting Idea 2: The need for forwarding command structure is essential especially when the scope of the operation is expanding. However, the command structure experienced some communication breakdown between commanders and the component units. Thus, conflicting the proper integration of upholding the directives according to the plan. In a join operation, all the commandants must coordinate closely in a joint decision-making process. The operation provided an opportunity to eliminate the enemy in a large group. However, in an operation point of view, the command structure on the ground squared the activity, and hence the operation was never executed according to the plan.

Supporting Idea 3: Having overthrown the Taliban government, the command structure felt that it had achieved success. As a consequence, they felt no need to focus on the operation as much of their emphasis was on the Iraq operation. On that account, there was an inadequate allocation of the resources to the operation. The commanding generals assumed a minimal number of the enemies existed. However, that was an assumption as there were many Al-Qaeda fighters in the valley. The assumption led to an inadequate allocation of troops for the operation contrary to what the commandants on the ground required.

Supporting Topic 2: Unity of Command in Operation Anaconda

Supporting Idea 1: A distinguished Unity of command requires placing of all the troops in a unique theatre to achieve the objective under one brain. Unity of command was essential in the success of the Anaconda Operation. It required unification of the local forces, the Special Forces and the airpower. Unity of command facilitated communication between the ground commanders and the Central command unit. The hierarchy facilitates efficient allocation of resources and mobilization of troops to the operation.

Supporting Idea 2: Conflict of unity of command was also evident from the operation. For example, as the troops carried on with the operation, a contingent of navy seals was brought into the process. The decision was in contrast to what the Army special operators thought. They did not understand the basics of inclusion of the Navy seals by the Central Command unit. The scenario depicts a breakdown in the structure of unity of command which requires the involvement of critical parties in a decision-making process. The structure of unity of authority requires that before an issue gets to the top executives, it should follow all the steps depicted by the structure.

Supporting Idea 3: Failure to adhere to the operational protocol lead to a series of mistakes by the team. The theory is enhanced by the fact that the fighting theatres came from different troops which had a separate command structure. During the early phases of the operation, instruction protocols were clear as per the plan. However, as the operation proceeded, different communication issues erupted. For instance, the splitting of the air support theatre led to confusions in the action as there were different requests from the controllers.

Supporting Topic 3: Joint Operations

Supporting Idea 1: Joint operations brings together wars troops to a broader national scale in which forces from the Army, Navy and Air are brought together in a joint operation. Operation Anaconda included the Navy, Air force and the military working together. The operation was different as it did not conform to the information battles. At the time of its occurrence, the joint military presence was not mature for the service. It also coupled up with the harsh terrain of the valley which contributed to lapse of operation at the initial stages. Coordinating the logistics in a large force increases the chances of friction within the operation.

Supporting Idea 2: Communication barrier was another challenge experienced during the Operation Anaconda. The troops were inclusive of local soldiers who were not very conversant with the communication language of the United States troops. Therefore, it was challenging for the army commanders to give instructions during the course. More importantly, the lack of similar political culture between the U.S and the Afghanistan soldiers manifested itself as a practical barrier which hindered operational efficiency.

The critical lesson from the joint operation includes regular pieces of training at the lower levels. It will enhance the level of corporation as well as the adhesiveness of the troops. Having a joint operation was beneficial to the procedure as it brought together different knowledge and experience required to fight a common enemy.

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